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Polar Terms and 
Int·erdependent Concepts 1 
Marcus G. Singer 
The norion of polariry. of polar concepts or polar rerms or (.."lolar n.·larionships. 
has been extensively used and widely applied, lx)th in the history of philosophy 
and in more recent times. Particularly prominenr examples are Heraclitus's 
theory of the war of opposites� and Hegel's and Schelling's mecaphysical drnma 
on such polar categories as idenrit)· and difference, unity and multiplicicy, nature 
and spirit. Waldo Emerson is noc often quoced chese days in philosophical circles, 
but he has provided a romanclic accounc of some inccrest: 
Polarity, or action and reaction, we 1neec in every part of nature; in 
darkness and lighc; in heat and cold; in che ebb and flow of waters; 
in male and female; in the inspiracion and expiration of planes and 
animals; in the equation of quantity and quality in rhe fluids of the 
animal body; in the systole and diastole of che heart; in rhe undula­
rions of fluids and of sound; in the centrifugal and centripetal grav­
ity; in electricity, galvanism, and chemical affinity. Superinduce 
magnetism at one end of a needle, che opposite magnetism takes 
place at the other end. If the south attracts. the north repels. To 
empty here. you must condense there. An inevitable dualism bisects 
nature, so that each ching is a half, and suggests another thing to 
make it whole; as, spirit, matter; man, woman; odd, even; subjec� 
tive, objective; in, out; upper, under; motion, rest; yea, nay:2 
In recent times the notion has taken a linguis1tic or conceptual turn; it :seems 
basically the same idea - even if somewhat less romantic - nonetheless. Thus 
the concept appears, even though it is not mentioned, in the following passage: 
"Certain words of our language operate in pairs, e.g., 'large' and 'small', 'animate' 
and 'inanimate\ '·vague' and 'clear', 'certain' and 'probable'. In their use in 
ordinary language a member of a pair requires its opposite - for animate is 
contrasted with inanimate, probability with certainty, vagueness with clearness .... 
it [is] essential to the meaning of the word 'vague' ... that vagueness [is] con­
trasted with clearness. "3 It seems clear enough that the terms mentioned here as 
contrasting or opposite are regarded as polar terms (though whether "vague,, 
contrasts in the required way with "clear" or, rather, with "precise", and whether 
"clear" and "precise" in rum are not also polar terms are nice questions I here 
only allude to.) 
It is clear, then, chat the concept has been around, and used and recognized. 
What has been lacking is analysis and elucidation. This I offer in what follows. 
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Connder the followmg definauon: .. A and B are polar word' if 1r '' 1mtxh ... 1hl� for 
an IIlStance of one to eX15t unle some corresponding 1mcance of cht> ochc:r al� 
exLSts". The author says that polar word are used m patT'" and ays furtht'.r: .. le b 
charactensac of a pair of polar words chat the meaning uf one . . .  1m·oh-c! the 
meaning of 1cs partner". ow there �t!m no doubt that 1f rwo term ar� o 
relaced chat there cannot be an instance of one unless there •� an in.;.cancc oi the 
ocher, then the meaning of one somehow mvolves the meaning of th� other, 
though 1c lS not clear JUSC what the nature of thts involvement is. However, che 
author goes on to say that " 1 peace' and 'war' are correlative or polar wor<ls",4 
and in saying chl5 is not applying che explicit definition he had provided for 
.,polar words"; he is, rather, creating whac he had described only a a "character­
istic" of polar terms as itself a defining characteristic. Although it 1s hard co 
arcain a state of peace on earth, it is surely not impossible for there to be peace 
without there also being war. The terntS "peace" and "war" are polar in the sense 
that the mean mg of each involves the meaning of the other, but it does noc follow 
that whenever there exists an instance of the one there must al o be an instance 
of the other. 
I t  is evident chat there are at least two senses of polar terms, one wider than 
and implied by the other. In one, (a) rwo terms A and B are polar iff the meaning 
10f one involves the meaning of the other. This is the wider sense, in which the 
relationship is conceptual only. In che other, the narrower stricter sense, (b) A 
and B are polar iff it is impossible for an instance of one w exist unless there also 
exists some corresponding instance of the ocher. Clearly, (b) implies (a), but not 
vice#versa. 
Instances of terms that are polar in the stricter, existential sense are: north and 
south, buying and selling (also buyer and seller), cause and effect, debtor and creditor, 
lessor and I.es.see, mortgagor and mortgagee. Terms that are polar in the wider, 
,conceptual sense, but not necessarily in the narrower, existential sense, are: means 
and ends, supply and demand, part and whole, peace and war, form and content, and 
question and aruwer. 
Unless this distinction is kept in mind, it is easy to infer a fallacious existence 
statement. Thus in the article on "The Ineffable" in The Encyclopedia of Philoso­
phy it is said that " ' Form' and 'content' ... are polar concepts; wherever there is 
form there must be contene'.5 "Form" and "contene• are indeed polar concepts, 
but in the conceptual, not the existential sense. For even though whatever can 
be called a "content" must have some form (though it can be a constantly 
shifting form, as with a cloud on a windy day) there can be an empty form, that 
is, a form empty of content. (The example, it is true, may be peculiar, since it 
may be that in order for there to be a form it is only necessary to imagine one, 
and the emptiness of an 11empty11 form may be regarded as itself content, as the 
hole in a doughnut may be regarded as part of the doughnut.) 
Manifestly some of the instances I have just provided are arguable. But I shall 
take it for granted that there is no dispute about the instances just presented as 
polar in the existential sense, and will go on to consider some members of the 
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her c.aregory. After all. how could chere be an instance of buying. of �omething 
ing boughc, Y.ichour chere also bemg an msrance of selling - of chm same duno in face. being sold? And how could someth ing be a cause wuhouc there � 1 somerhing rhat ic lS a :�use of. which of course is �n eff�cc! Com·�rsel\', 
w could anything be an etten w1thouc its being an effect of .1..1mething. which oi course is 1cs cause? And. though one and the same person can be both a 
aebwr and a credimr - a debcor co one person or m one relanonship and a 
creditor co or in another - gi\'en char there is someone who is a debtor chere is 
5l101eone or some agencv co whom chat person is in debt and thac is rhe credimr. 
The con\'erse argument also holds. 
�lith regard co means and ends. however, or suppl)· and demand. the exact 
narure of rhe relationship may seem more problematic. \YJe can ha"e some end 
",chout there being any means a\'aiJable m char end. lf we chink of something as 
3 means we necessarily chink of it as a means to some end, which we think of as 
ac lease capable of being brought inco existence; if iit were already in existence or 
obtained, we should have no need of che means. But the converse existence 
scacement does not hold. Admirtedly, the peculiariry of chis example is that if we 
"have some end" the end is noc yet in existence. le is an end aimed at, or an ''end 
in ,,-j,ew''. Nonecheless, I am still of the opinion thac there can be an end, meaning 
thac someone can have that end. without there being any means to that end and 
wichouc there being any possibility of such means being developed. Similarly -
inde�d. more emphatically - with supply and demand. There can be a supply of 
something with no demand whatever for it, and there can be a demand for 
something of which there is no supply whatever, as of wacer in a desert. Again, 
alchough rhere can be no answer without there being some question it is an 
answer to (so that answer implies question) there can be questions without 
answers, hard as that may be to accept. Pan and whole have their own peculiari, 
ties. Something can be a part of some whole chat is conceived of but never 
comes into existence; thus, something could be conceived of as a part of some 
perpetual morion machine yet c:o be builc, and which we can be sure never will 
be butlt, or the air force could order and store a supply of parts for some aircraft 
rhar never gees built, and in that sense never gets off the ground. 
Some other examples of terms that are presumably polar are worch some 
discussion, or at least presentation: colored, colorless; white, black; early, late; 
before, after; up, down; right, left; ease, west; winning, losing; succeeding, /ailing; love, 
hate; au;action, repulsion; "per capita", "pe; stirpes"; convex, concave; pleasure, pain; 
good, baa; right, wrong; true, false. And there are some instances rhat seem polar 
buc that I am not at all sure fit the category even conceptuaUy. Some such 
examples are knowledge and belief, friendship and acquainumce, joy and sorrow. life 
and death. 
Early and lace seem to me to be polar only conceptually, not existentially; we 
can conceive of a world in which everyone is always early, no one is ever lace, or 
vice,versa. Winning and losing, considered as events in some compecition or 
contest, seem existentially polar; no one literally can win if everyone wins, so 
someone muse lose if anyone is co win. On the other hand, winning and losing, 
conceived of in relation to achieving one's aims where no concesc is involved, are 
4
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polar onJy conceptually, not existennallv. We can conceive of every�me· .. auns 
being achieved, hence of everyone m thl.S senk wmnmg: and we can al�o 
conceive of an unhappy world m which no one' aims are ach1e\·eJ. so that 
everyone loses. Winning and losmg, even in chis unhappv world, are ull to � 
understood in relation to each ocher. Similarly for succeedm.g and fad.mg. le is ry, 
necessary, except again in the case of a contest. that some fail for others to 
succeed. Not every activicy is a game, much less a zero-sum game. 
More problematic are teadung and learnmg. As ever)' teacher knows, there ca: 
be teaching without learning. Perhaps this is not very dfecnve reaching, but Lt 
can be teaching nonetheless. No doubt there cannot be teaching without there 
being at least a would.-be or presumptive learner, but this presumpuve learner 
might not be learning. It should be clear also that there can be learning wichou1 
teaching, as where a child learns to stand up or to walk without being taught 
how, or where one learns to swim without being taught. Someone might want to 
say that this is self ,teaching, but this sounds too much like an ad hoc response � 
save a theory, the theory that teaching and learning are polar conceptions and 
chat there cannot be one without che ocher. These considerations seem m me ro 
indicate that teaching and learning are noc existentially polar but that they are 
conceptually polar. The situation is that "learning" is an achievement word, 
04teaching" is not. This matter. however. is really a topic in itself. Similarly for 
teacher and Leamer, as distinct from teaching and learning, and for teacher and 
caught. Ocher pairs that manifestly are topics in themselves are pleasure and pain, 
right and wrong, and crue and false. I return to some of these in what follows. 
II  
The notion of "the meaning of one term involving the meaning of the other" is 
vague, and I wane co try to get it more precise and also darify it. Although the 
meaning of the term uhusband" involves the meaning of the term 11wife,,, the W3\ 
in which the meaning of "husband" involves the meaning of "wife" is not the "''3' 
in which "red" involves "colored" or in which 11husband11 involves "male". (I am 
going by present usage linked with present custom and present law. There is no 
celling what changes will occur in custom, usage, and law. But if such changes 
should occur, another example could be substituted.) We can say that "husband 
involves (implies) "male" on the ground chat whoever is a husband is necessaril) 
male, (x) (Hx ::5 Mx). However, anyone who is a husband is certainly not a wife 
i. e., (x) (H x '::5 -Wx). Yet the meaning of "husband" involves the meaning of 
uwife" in the sense that if anyone is a husband then there is necessarily someone 
else who is a wife; and the converse holds as well. The formula for "husband" an 
C4 • r II h ' w11e , t en, is: 
(1)  (x) [Hx ::> .  ( 3 y) (x*Y. Wy) & Wx :5 .  ( 3 y) (x*Y. Hy) ).6 
En the particular case of "husband" and "wife", we need the further condition 
that no husband is also a wife, namely (x) (H x :5 - W x). However, this 
condition is not essential for the polarity of "wife" and "husband". 
5
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There t�. ar least m a number l)t instance'. a d")�t' rarallel herween the 
�moru of polar tern� and l'1f ct'1nver!'e relations, where rhe con,·ers� of a rd.nion 
R as  [he relanon char hold� l:-oetween ,. and x when R h('l� �tween x and \': 
u 
R = Cnv1\� { xRv}. 
The converse of husband. or lu.t.sb«n.d of. is the relanon berween ,. and x such that 
< x 1� the hu ·band of \\ and rhe converse of husbtmd b u·ife. Another fom1ula tl1r 
husband anJ wife LS rhu::.: 
(2) (x) (y) (xHy =i y\X'x). 
Many polar terms fit this par-tern of converse relation .. such as "parent" and 
t -child", "earlier" and ''lacer". "large" and "small". \Xlhar is required for th1$ 
t.. parallel is chac a monadic property be 1ncerpreced as a relanonal pw�ny l)if as 
derived from a relational properry. This ts what Ari cotle maintained m his 
c discussion of relative tem1s.i A husband is always the husband of somebody. A 
child is always the child of somebody. However, rhe pattern does not hold 
universally. Take the term "spouse". A spouse is alwa 'S the spouse of somebody. 
just as someone who is married is married to . omeboJy. 
Yet the converse of the relation spouse is the relation spouse. and the rem1 
• "spouse" is not a polar term. Still, the reference to converse relations is genuinely 
illuminating in some cases. The terms "large" and "small" are [lX>lar terms 
because whenever something is large there must be (or perhaps must have been) 
something small by reference to which what is said co be large can be made out 
co be large, and vice,versa - becau e largeness is cmurasced with smallness. Yet 
ic seems clearer to say that the terms "large" and "small" are polar terms because 
rhe relation smaller than is the converse of the relation larger cllan: x is larger than 
r iff y is smaller than x. 
But the class of polar tem1s is not identical wirh or equivalcm to the class of 
converse relations. Not every case of polar terms is a case of a relation and its 
converse or of terms derived from a relation and its converse. Nor are all polar 
rerms instances of converse relations. The converse of spouse is ' spouse, the converse of sibling is sibling, and, to t:ake a more interesting instance, 
the converse of identity is identity. So we have to rule ouc symmetrical relations 
(where a relation is symmetrical if it is identical wi:th its converse, and asymmetri, 
cal if it is incompatible with its converse) .  It appears, however, that we can take 
the property of being an asymmetrical relation as definintv ne class of poltu 
rerms. Thus, if R is an asymmetrical relation, then R and R (R,con'u rse) are 
polar cenns, and the tem1s corresponding to or derived from R and R (as "large" 
and "small" are derived from or correspond to "larger" and "smaller") are also 
polar cerms. 
This, however, does not eliminate all difficulties, and it also slides over the 
distinction between the two types of polar terms distinguished, the conceptual 
and the existential. Terms like "north" and "south" are such that if there is an 
instance of one there must simultaneously exist an instance of the other. Terms 
6
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like "'parent'" and .. child". or even more oi'.i\'IOu .. h, -t!arlier .. anJ "lacer". art> �· 
subJect co this condmon. If a occur., earlier (or later) chan b. b Joe not oc cur � 
the ame ume as a. Wich terms like "'hu banJ" and u"',fe .. (g1\'1.:n rr�senc u sa�· 
slight vananon seerru called for: if chere b an m ranee t>f one chere mu�r t>x1 -
else there muse have exi.sced, an instance of che mher. 
Term lilce "motion" and "re t" are dtffer1ent m a  more tntere tmg way, and 
apparently generate a third sense of polar terms. We cannot ay that 1f some. 
thing is in motion there muse be somechmg else char l5 ac rest. Yee mouon and 
seem unquestionably co be polar concepts; ne1chc::r can be under rood "'1chout 
reference t0 the other. The relation seems co be that we could not determine 
char x is in morion without reference to some y char is, or has been, or can he 
conceived to be, at rest in relation to x. I shall say that such rerms are 
episterrUCallJ polar, and define this sense as follows: A and B are epi.stemicaU)· prJ.: 
iff it is impossible for an instance of one co be ascertained, made out, discover� 
or known without reference co che other. 
That not all polar terms arc or involve converse relacioru can be shown by 
instances. "Right" and "wrong" are polar cerms, yec neither is, nor is eicher 
derivative from, the converse of the ocher. Similarly with "true,. and .. false", 
"valid,, and Hinvalid' .. "sound" and "unsoundn. "correc t" and "incorrect"; and I 
think also that this is true of "male" and "female", though there is no point, 
especially in this context, in arguing about the example. One could maintain, n. 
doubt, that "correct" and "incorrect" are relative terms, serving as surrogates fa 
the converse relations of "more correc t" and .. less correc t", or 11more correct" 
and "more incorrect", though this seems forced. "A is more male than B" and 'i 
is more female than A" seem somewhat less forced. Whether this is true of malt 
and female depends on biological faces, perhaps also on social conven'tions, 
currently shifting. 0Goodl" and �bad", on the other hand. seem easily definable 
terms of "better" and "worse", though where one goes from there is not readily 
determined. I see no chance, however, of anything similar being done with 
"right" and uwrong" - it somehow wouldn•t seem right - or with "true" and 
"false". Not all dualisms are untenable. Yet it is clear enough that these terms t' 
polar: each is to be understood by reference co che other; with "true" and "false' 
and "valid" and 11invalid" further argument appears in the sequel. 
Consider now "inside"' and "outside". We say chat a is a husband, but nor c 
a is an inside - rather, a has an inside. If a has an inside then a has an outside, 
and conversely, and inside and outside are polar. (Notice that this is noc to say 
that every surface must have both an inside and an outside.) But the pattern wt 
obtain for inside and outside, namely 
(3) (x) (Ix 5 Ox), 
where "Ix" means "x has an inside", will not fit the pattern of "husband" and 
"wife", and ••inside" and outside" will not fit pattern ( l } .  It is surely false that if 
something has an inside then there must be something else that has an outside. 
This difficulty, however, may be only apparent. We use locutions like ''the insi& 
of x", and there is a relation inside of, the converse of which is outside of. Thus 
7
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che re la non msr.de of fits pan: em (2), 1. e .. (x) (\·) (xly :! ,Ox) .  And it we �peak l)t 
: bemg che inside oi x. "mside" and "outside" will fie patten1 ( l ) . Also, ir ma\' be 
thac che condition of pattern ( 1  ) . that x;it:v. is too resrricti\'e. \X'e can gel a 
pattern 
( 4) ( x) : <l> x :5 ( 3 y) 'V \' . "' x :::5 t 3 \') <l> y. 
This fies "inside" and "outside" when "<l> x" is mcerpreced a· "x has an in�iJe", 
nor as "x is an inside" on che model of "x 1s a husband", and "'I' x" is mterprete<l 
as "x has an oucside". 
Here we have an applicacion for che phrase ..  tem\, corresponding to l"lr 
de·ri,·ed from a relation and its con\'erse". The t:em1s "inside·" and ''outside" 
correspond to or are deri\'ed from rhe con\'erse relations inside of and oucsul� of, 
as "large" and "sm:ill" correspond ro larger clu.m and snwller rlum. Hence '"inside" 
and "outside" are polar terms. 
Still, chis does not take care of all types of polar terms. The temls "peace" and 
"war" do nor correspond to relation in chis way, and it is not necessar)', as we 
noticed, chat peace and war muse both exisc if one is to exisl. Nor is the exisc· 
ence condicion necessarily one of simulcaneous exiscence. If a certain state l)f 
affairs is describable as a state of peace the most we can infer is that there has 
been or could be war, by reference to which and by contrast with which the 
word "peace" has meaning. One idea in\'olved here is that of opposition. Peace 
and war are in some way opposed to each other. 
III  
Before going on, however, co consider the matter of opposites and the extension 
of the idea of polarity, something further should be said about the basic idea of 
polar terms, that of the meaning of one involving the meaning 
of the other. The point, and potential problem, is that instead of A being defined 
in cerms of or as a function of B, or B being defined in cem1s of or as a funcrion of 
A, with polar terms we not onJy go both ways bur must. A and B are defined in 
cerms of and as a function of each ocher. 
The idea of defining or explaining two terms by reference to each other is 
bound to generate some skepticism about circularity of definition. An accounr of 
A in terms of B combined with an account of B in terms of A seems inherently 
circular, violates one of the long standing rules for definitions, and so on. The 
intriguing thing about polar terms is chat with respect to them the ordinary rules 
are off, and such accounts not only work bur with polar terms are actually 
essential. They cannot be understood, really, in any ocher way. As the insrances 
presented show, there is nothing odd or strange about chis, depending on the 
examples talked about. One can of course find instances in which the circular 
procedure does not work at all, at least for persons of ordinary intelligence. One 
such instance is delightfully presented in P. G. Wodehouse's A Pelican at 
Blandings, in which the somewhat dotty Lord Emsworch is instructed by his 
brother Galah�d Threepwood as follows: 
8
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.. Thu LS very pleasant. Galah.d, � ht: ad, anJ GJlh 
endorsed che senumenc . 
.. , was chmkmg ch� ":>ame chmg, Clarence. �o Connit:, 
no Dunstable, Peace, perfect peace v.1rh lon�J one far 
awa�, a one mighc a\. I'm 50m· I'm leaving." 
.. You mu c, I uppo�?" 
"I doubt 1£ che marnage would be legaJ wnhout m�.'· 
"Someone you knov.· is �mg marned!" 
"My god!>On." 
"I '\'e never met him. have I ?" 
"Cenamly you ha\'e. The chap who falls dowrucaLr . " 
.. Ah ye.5. Who is he marrying?" 
''Lmda G1lpm." 
"Who is Lmda Gilpin?" 
"The gul who kisses him after he' fallen downstair . I 
am co be Johnny's be c man." 
"Who -" 
"Yes, [ see I'm confusing you, Clarence, Johnny and my 
godson are one and che same. All scraighc now?" 
"Perfectly, perfeccly. Your godson Johnny is marrying 
Linda Gilpin." 
"You puc ic in a nutshell. And I have co be 1there when 
che firing squad assembles. Furthermore, Trou t and 
Vanessa Polk insist on me dining with chem before they 
go off on their honeymoon." 
"Who is T rouc?" 
"The chap who has married Vanessa Polk." 
"Who is Vanessa Polk?" 
"The girl who has married Trout. They've both married 
each other, and they're going for their honeymoon co Nassau." 
"That's where the Falls are, isn't it? People go over them 
in barrels, which is a thing I don't suppose many young 
couples would care co do. But no doubt Mr. and Mrs. Trout 
will find some ocher way of passing the time. Vanessa Polk, 
did you say? Wasn't she staying here?" 
"That's right, and so was Trout." 
((I thought the names were familiar. Nice girl. Very sound 
on pigs. 1 hope she will be very happy." 
"I'm sure she will." 
"And I hope your godson will be very happy." 
"Have no uneasiness about that. He loves his popsy." 
111 thought you said her name was Linda.'' 
1'Popsy is the generic term .... 8 
This sort of interrelationship or cockeyed explication is definitely not the sort 
involved with polar terms, the point of which is that neither of a pair of polar 
9
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cerms can be under rood without reierence to the other. 
h should be emphasi:ed chat "the meanmg of one in"oh-es che meaning of the 
orher"' does not mean merely that the meanings of the rwo are the same, which is 
crue of anv synon mous term� or equ1\'alenc expre� ·ion and is a ·iruarion 
broughr into being by any formal definition. \X'hac it means is (i) char neither A 
nor B can have a meanin° unless the ocher has a meaning, and these meanings 
are intrinsically connecced, (ii) chat both cenm muse be defined simulcaneously, 
each by reference co the ocher, (iii) that neither can be explained without 
explaining the other, and (i\') that neither can be understood wuhout und�r­
scanding the other. Each essentiall · invokes and implicates the other, as each 
necessarily requires the other. Con equendy, definition (a) - of concepmal 
polarity - is co be understood as (a 1 (a·prime): A and B are polar iff neither A 
nor B can be defined, explicated, understood, or conceived of without defining. 
explaining, understanding, or conceiving of the other, and neither can have a 
meaning unless the other has a meaning.0 It is in this sense that the meaning t. f 
one "involvesn the meaning of the ocher. 
IV 
Polarity has traditionally been conceived in terms of opposites or extremes, as in 
che case of the north and souch poles. One popular dictionary definition is 
"occupying or characterized by opposite extremes". Bennett and Baylis define 
polar concepts as "incompatible concepts which are . . .  at opposite extremes of an 
ordered series of concepts", and Henry Sidgwick once said, of someone else 
interested in psychic research, "we are in polar opposition: my sole aim is proof, 
whereas L. 0 . ... appears as indifferent co scientific proof ... as the most woolly· 
headed enthusiast" . 10 The meaning here is plain enough. And the notion of polar 
cerms is traditionally connected with that of opposition. Aristotle in Cacegoriae 
developed a theory of opposition and relative tem1s relevant co the topic of polar 
cerms. (See note 7.) C. K. Ogden worked out a theory of opposition according co 
which there are three different kinds of opposition: opposites may be either the 
cwo extremes of a scale or series; the two sides of a cut; or opposites in the sense 
of opposite directions. 1 1  
These accounts consider opposition as always involving a pair - duo - of 
elements. But more than two elements can be opposed to one another, and there 
is consequently an extension of polarity beyond che domain of pairs. Further, 
more, there is no need for che notion of opposices as exclusive criterion of polar 
terms. The notion of polar terms can just as well be used as a criterion of 
opposition. 
There is a natural extension from the pair of polar terms: 
parent 
�child 
to the trio of polar terms: 
10
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or the trio: 
father mother 
�child/ 
parenc 
/ "" son daughter 
and from thence to the quartet: 
Although the meaning of "father'' does not involve the meaning of "daughter", ic 
involves the meaning of "child", a child is either a son or a daughter, and the 
meanings of "son'' and ''daughter,, involve each other. (fhe explanation of this is 
that son is a male child, daughter is a female child, and umale" and "female" are 
polar terms.) Further, if child requires ics opposice, parenl, chen son can be said to 
require its opposites, daughter and parern; and if parent requires its opposite, child, 
then father requires its opposites, mother and chiUl. 
It is true that opposites are normally thought co come in pairs, and conse, 
quencly, with the idea that something can hav,e several opposites, the concept of 
opposition becomes troublesome. Bue this idea about opposition and polarity 
leads to a further sense, the notion of polarity without opposition, through the 
extension of the concept of polar notions to a wider range beyond the original 
idea of pairs of opposites, and beyond the underlying metaphor of north and 
south poles. Multiple conceptions can be polar - multi,polar or interdependent 
- and there is illumination in extending the concept in this way, for it enables 
the polar or interdependence relation to be understood. The basis of the 
relationship between husband and wife is marriage, and there is similarly a basis, 
though it can be of a different type, for every polar relationship. One thing is 
long, or talli and another short on the basis of a standard of length or height 
(and of course what is tall on one standard can be short on another). It :is on the 
basis of this standard that the meaning of each of the terms involves the meaning 
of the other, and in defining a polar term, as polar, this relationship must be 
specified, if only implicitly. (Thus there are senses of "short" and "long" that are 
not polar, as in "an hour long", ul long for her", and "we are two persons short".) 
The basis of the polar relationship between rights and duties is the rationale or 
reason or ground on which one person has a duty and another a right, 12 and it is 
not implausible to hold that the notions of rights, duties1 moral agent, and moral 
community are in some way such as this interdependent. I am not here main, 
taining that rights and duties are existentially polar; I am taking it for granted 
that they are conceptually polar, and I am maintaining that rights and duties are 
11
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i:nrerdependenr - multi-polar - \\ith a whole range of notions.'' 
Here are some other examples of interdependem or multi-polar concepts . 
.. Premise" and '"conclusion,. are polar terms - the meaning of one involves che 
cneanffig of the ocher. and whenever there is an �ranee of one chere is an 
[!lSt31lCe of the other. But we are speaking here ot the premise and conclu�'ion of 
an argument or inference, nor of Land and che bU1iJdings upon it or the condu­
sioo of a scory, and it is argumenr (or inference) nhat is che basis of che polar 
re}acion between premise and conclusion. And che following concepts - clearly 
roore chan two - are incerdependent: premise, conclusion, argument (infer­
ence), principle of the argument (defined as the proposition that che premise of 
che argument implies the conclusion). presupposition of the argument (defined 
as a proposition that must be true if the argument is ,•al id), and validity (since 
every argument claims to be valid the concept of argument muse be defined in 
1erms of valid argument). 14 
What this means is that none of these concepts can be understood or 
explained or defined without reference to (not jusc one other lbut) all the ochers. 
By an extension of the conceptual sense of polar terms, interdependent concepts 
are concepts so rdated that the meaning of one involves the meanings of the 
ochers. It follows that, given a set of incerdependenc concepts. no one of them is 
basic or fundamental, with the others derivative or derived from it or dependent 
00 or to be explicated by reference to it, and not vice,versa. (In any given system 
of such interdependent ideas, which idea is to be treated as basic or fundamental 
is a
'matter of aesthetics or convenience.) Interdependence - many-term 
polaricy - may well characterize ideas that are themselves fundamental, that lie 
a£ the foundation of our thought, such as necessity, logical truth, self-contradic· 
tion, denial. possibility, a priori, empirical, ... ... (synthetic, analytic?). 
To come back to teaching and learning for a moment, whenever there is 
teaching and at Least attempted learning, there is a third thing, the thing taught, 
whether it is a matter of teaching someone how to swim or teaching mathemat, 
ics or philosophy. At college or university, we think of ourselves as teaching 
certain subjects, such as history or epistemology, rather than as teaching stu­
dents, and of students as studying them and presumably learning them. ln lower 
levels, teachers are thought of as teaching students or pupils, but there is always 
something they are teaching them, such as how t,o read, to do sums, or proper 
deportment. But no matter how we conceive of the differences at different levels 
of learning there is always, along with teaching and learning, a third term, the 
thing taught, and these terms are interdependent. Although there can be 
teaching without anything being learned, and there can be learning without 
anything being taught, there cannot be teaching without something being 
£aught, so here we have an interdependent triad. 
Another example is provided by Peirce's discussion of doubt, belief, and 
inquiry, which, as Peirce explains them, are polar or interdependent concepts. 
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, there is good reason to bellieve that, as Peirce 
conceives of them, the ideas of doubt, belief, inquiry, truth, and reality are multi, 
polar, such that the meaning of any one of them essentially involves the 
meanings of all the others. 15 
12
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One of John Kenneth Galbraith's typically wry obserYarions is that: 
Of all the mysteries of the stock exchange there is none so 
impenetrable as why there should be a buyer for e\·eryone 
who seeks to sell. October 24, 1929, showed char what is 
mysterious is not inevitable. Often there were no buyers, 
and only after wide vertical declines could anyone be 
induced co bid.16 
This passage only confirms what those who are not inveterate optimists alreadJ 
were aware of: seeking to sell is not existentially polar with finding a buyer. Tht­
are, to be sure, conceptually related. And buying and selling are existentially 
polar. As Galbraith also observes: "Not only were a recorded 12,894,650 shares 
sold on October 24; precisely the same number were bought". If we specify that 
what is being bought and sold are securities, we generate a relationship of 
interdependence, involving the polar terms buying and selling, as well as 1llOruryQ 
credit, the market (without which there could be no such transactions), a systetl! 
of corporations or companies or firms, and investors or speculators, and no douh 
a bit more. I don't wish to venture far into economics or into the ideology of 
capitalism� I only point out that supply and demand are polar concepts, and on 
the supply and demand theory of price, price is the resultant of the two forces cl 
supply and demand. If this is so, these concepts are also interdependent.17 
v 
It must be recognized that an unusual amount of nonsense - even for philoso­
phy - has been written about polarity. An interesting example, one you are llC( 
likely to be familiar with, is provided by the following. After reference to "the 
primary duality that governs both the material world and the universe of the 
mind", the author I have selected for the present honor goes on to say: 
We know that every concept has its opposite, by which it 
is defined. High/Low, Convex/Concave, Day/Night - it is 
impossible to think of one member of these couples (or 
pairs) without thinking of the other. One member is 
implicit in the other, the inverse being, on the whole, a 
mirror in which every reality rests on its exact opposite -
its reflected image. 18 
It is manifestly false that every concept has its opposite. A list drawn at random 
of concepts that have no opposites would include the following: table, chair, 
desk, wood, paper, pen, pencil, typewriter, computer, book, radio, television, 
photograph, newspaper, magazine, philosophy (unfortunately the opposite of 
philosophy is not nonsense), concept, percept (someone might insist of course 
that these two are opposites) , thought, word, deed. As to the idea of "a mirror m 
which every reality rests on its exact opposite," the less said the better .. I certainl-
13
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�� chat I have nor added to tht" amount o( no_nsense - reall\' immense - chat 
�.lS h!en ''Titten about polarity. But I must conte ·s that I am not reall ' much 
� med about it. '9 
APPEl DIX I 
Here IS a compendium of the senses of "polar terms" distinguished above. 
ta) A and B are polar iff the meaning of on� im·olve� the 
meaning of the ocher. Df. of "concepruall)• polar". 
r (a ) A and B are polar iff neither A nor B can be defined, 
� e>.-plicaced, understood, or conceived of without 
denning, explaining, underscanding, or conceiving of 
che other, and neither can have a meaning unless the 
other has a meaning. Explication of "conceptually 
I n po ar . 
• th) A and B are polar iff it is impossible for an instance 
G of one to exist unless chere also exists some corre, 
l spending instance of the other. Df. of "existentially 
l tt po ar . 
(c) A and B are polar iff it is impossible for an instance 
of one to be ascenained, made out, discovered, or 
known without reference to the other. Of. of 
"episcemically polar". 20 
Adminedly hardly anything has been said herein about epistemic polarity, a 
conception that remains to be explored. 
APPENDfX 11 
The reader might be interested in some commencs made by Max Black on some 
earlier versions of this paper, which he saw some time ago, especially since, so far 
as I krnow, he wroce nothing further on the topic since the passages I quoted at 
rhe outset. On one version he said: 
I agree that your interpretation [of conceptual polarity) is 
the one that mosc repays consideration. Suppose we try: 
A and B are polar = (Df) the sense of A is a function of 
che sense of B and conversely. The difficulty would then 
be to explain the meaning of 11function11 in this context. 
We mi,ght say the sense of A is a function of the sense of B ::E 
Some proposition of which A is a nonvacuous constituent 
entails some proposition of which B is a nonvacuous 
constituent. I don't know whether this would work. 
14
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On another version he said: 
I confess that the reference co "war" and .. peace" was a 
blunder on my part. There seem m fact to be two nocions 
involved at lease: 
I.A depends u/XJrl B = (Df) (3 x) Ax :5(3 y) By 
A and B are polar = (Df) A depends upon B and 
B depends upon A 
(I don't think it important whether x=y or not) 
Of course the above would need obvious modifications 
if relations other than predicates were involved. 
I I .  A and B are related in meaning = (Df) There 
is at lease one necessary truch about A and B 
in which neither occurs vacuously (?) 
(I'm more doubrful about this.) 
The suggestion I found most promising was the first, explaining A and B are 
polar as "the sense of A is a function of the sense of B and conversely". But I 
have not travelled chat route here, and it is arguable, no doubt, that "the 
meaning of one involves the meaning of the other,, is still in need of elucidation. 
I add that it was Black who suggested the use of the term "interdependent" tt 
me, a suggestion I adopted (though I now think of "multi�polar .. as an alcerna. 
tive). He also suggested in some discussions on the philosophy of mathematics 
long ago that the notions of function, variable, value of a variable, value of a 
function, and so on are interdependent in the way depicted above. 
APPENDIX Ill 
Other, Sometimes Polar, Discussions of Polarity 
References to some works explaining or making use of the notion of polar te� 
or polarity, are scattered in the notes. For the prudently incurious, or the 
imprudently curious, some others are provided here, as sources either of enlight· 
enment or bewilderment. In a number of the works listed, perhaps most, there is 
more on opposition than on polaricy; indeed, in many polarity as such is not 
mentioned at all. However, can there be one without the other? Although 
polarity and opposition are not opposites, they are almost unquestionably polar. h 
should be remarked that I first learned about a number of these works through 
Ogden's penetrating monograph Opposition (cited note 1 1) .  This is of course n0t 
a complete list. A compete list of discussions of polarity is unthinkable. 
Bahm, Archie J., Polarity, Dialectic and Organicity (Albuquerque: World 
Books, 1970, 1976). 
Baldwin, James Mark, Thought and Things (London: Swan Sonnenschein & 
Co., 1906), Vol. I ,  ch. ix; Vol. II (1908), sec. 4, pp. 216-20; Vol. Ill (London: 
George Allen & Co., 19 1 1),  ch. viii, sec. 9, pp. 1 14� 16. 
Bogoslavsky, Boris B., The Technique of Controversy (New York: Harcourt, 
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Brace and Comran\', 192�). pp. 14, 1 1  - 19, l·f'l1"4. 
Ea con. Ralph �i.. General Logic • 'ew York: Charle� ribncr ·� :m .. 1 9  1 ) .  
FF· 59. 3 3. 3 3A.  3 1 4- 1 5. 
Fischer, Ludw1g. The Srnutur� of Tlwughr { 1 927). tran.lated from the German 
b\" W. H .  Johnswn (Lond�'n: Ge )rge Allen & Unwin, 19 1 ) . pp. 67-9. 7 . 9( • l .  
tH. 1 75. 203-4. 290- 1 ,  3 1  - 19. 
Sheldon, \Xfi.lmon Henry, God ani:l Poi1riC".'' ().lew Haven: Yale Unh·crsicy 
Press. 1954). e�P· pp. 1 10- 1 2. 674-9. 
, Process and Pokml""\' {New YNk: Columbia Unh·ersicy 
__ __,,,--,--����- . . Pre . 1 944). 
�--,-:--:-���-=�-
• Srrife of S)•srems and Producriw Dunl1ry (Camhridg�: 
Harvard Uni\'ersiC)' Pre� , 1 9 1  ) . e p. pp. 4 1 3· 19, 4 7 2.  
Tarde, G., L 'Opposition Unl\'ersdle: Essai D'Une Theorie Des Conmtr�s (Paris: 
Felix Akan, 1897). passim. 
Taylor, Richard, Mecaph)•sics (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prenrice-Hall, 1983). 
ch. 1 1 ,  "Polarity". {This chapter i· not in the lst or 2nd edition .) 
Veitch, John, lnstiwres of Logic (Edinburgh: \Xlilliam Blackwood anJ Sons, 
1885), secs. 220-4, pp. 1 76-8 1 .  
Notes 
Although it comes nowhere near the tandarJ� he set in ht> o\m '''ntm� un I 
chinking, m v1cw of hi contribution:- w 1he iJca� :-cc forth hcrcin(�cc Aprcnd1x 11) I 
dedicate this paper to che memory of Max Black. one -tin\\.' tcachcr. lon�11mc tm·nJ. 
Ralph Waldo Emcr:>On, ·'Compcnsauon", fusa:-•s: F1rs1 Scnl!.S { 184 1 ). pnr. 7: 111 Tltt! 
Complete &Stlys and Other \�nungs. ed. by Brouk:. Atkmson (Ne"' York: the �ltl\.lem 
Libra!)•, 1940), p. 172. 
l Norman Malcolm. "Moore and Ordinary Language", m The Plulo.s()pfry of G. c. 
Moore, ed. P. A. Sch1lpp {Evanston: Norrhwestem University. 1942). p. 364. 
Max Black, Criiical Thinking {2nd ed.: New York: Prcn11cc-Hall. Inc .. 1952), pp. 
443. 46. 2 1 1 .  
W. E. Kcnnick. "The Ineffable", The En.cyclopedia of Philosophy, eel. Paul EJwarJs 
(New York: The Macmillan Company & 11w Free Press. 1967). "t'I. 4, p. 183. 
b I am using the symbol ":5 " to srand for necessarily implies. or "ncccss�1rtly 1f', nnll "a" 
for "necessarily if and only if", or "is neccssanly e,quivalcnr (()''. 
Ariscoclc, Ca1egoriae, chs. 7, 10, 1 1 ,  13. "Those thing:. arc called relative, which 
being either said co be of something else or relacc<l to �omething else, arc explamcd 
by reference to that ocher thing'' (6a36). Also: "All relatives have corrclarive : O}" 
the tem1 "slave" we mean "slave of a master'' ... (6b26). 
s P. G. Wodehouse, A Pelican a1 Bumdings (1969), quoted from Vimagc Wodehouse, 
ed. Richard Usbome (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 343·4. 
9 I am indebted for this last phrase, and for some he.Ip wilh undcrsrnnJing how bcsu 10 
explain "che meaning of one involves the meaning of the other", w some remarb by 
Georges Dicker when chis paper was presented at the State University of New York 
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at Bcoclcport on March 6. l991 Other people at the wll�u1um "ho maJe hdr1ul 
rcmarlu include Jack Ghchnan. anJ 5'0ftle othc:n "ho-.e na� I uniortun.tteh JiJ 
no< repter. 
t:i Alfred A. Bennen and Olar� A. �las, Fonnal Logic. ('Sc'-' Yorlc Punn<:e-HalL 
Inc. 1939). p. 78: A. S. and E. M. S .• Hem) Su/gu.1Ck � MemcKT (LonJon. 
Macmillan and C.O .. Lui. 1906). p. 494. 
1• C. K. Ogden, ()ppos,WfJTI (London: Kegan Paul. Trench.Trubner & Co .. ltJ .. 1932). 
�p. PP· 50ff. 
1• I have argued chu. though wtchoul expbcn n:ference to polar mms. an "The BaS1S u{ 
R.ighu and DurJCS", Phdo� S�. 23. 1972. pp. 48. 51. 
u I have argued du.s, wuh expltcn reference ro polar term . m "Some Reflecnoru un 
R.ighu: Human. Natural, Moral. and Fundamental", Transacn.oru of the \X·'l.SConsm 
Acadmry of Soctas. Aru & Lmers. vol. 72 (1984). pp. 63-4; chc pre5ent paper b 
meant r.o supply some of the pluJosopbicaJ background for che claims made there 
abouc the mrerdependencc o( nghts, duaes, and the moral commumt)'. 
14 Thu. has been argued effectively by Sid Thomas. Jr., in "The Srarus of the Generali· 
z.anon Pnnc1plc", Amrncan Philosoplucal Quanedy, vol. 5, July 1968, p. 181.  
i s  C. S. Peirce, "The Fix.anon o( Behef'. O>llecud Papen (Cambridge: Harvard 
Umvemry Press, 1934). 5.370·5.375; and "How co Make Our Ideas Oear", 5.394. 
The"clsewhere" is M. G. Singer. "Truth, Belief, and Inquiry m Peirce", Transacuons 
of w C. S Pmce Socs.ery. XXI. 1985. pp. 398-9, 402. 403. 
16 J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crruh (3rd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1972). p. 104; the next senccnce quoted i.s from p. 1 14. 
11 There i.s another analysis on quite different lines by C. K. Grant, "Polar Concepts 
and MeraphysicaJ Arguments", Procudings of the Ariswulian Society, vol. 56, 1955-
56, pp. 83-108. I strongly recommend this, although I have chosen noc co discuss ic 
and have proceeded on quite different lines.. Morris R. C.Ohen made excensive use of 
what he called the principle of polaricy in Reason and Nature (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and C.Ompany, 19 31) ,  passim, and in ocher works. such as A Prefaa co Logic 
(New Yorlc: Henry Holt and Company, 1944), pp. 74·5. Thus (Reason and Nature, p. 
426): "Unlvcrsalicy and individualicy, justice and the law, the ideal and the acrual, 
are inseparable, yet never completely identifiable. Like being and becoming, unicy 
and pluraUry, rest and modon, they are polar cacegories. Deny one and the other 
becomes meaningless. Yee the cwo muse always remain opposed." 
La Jerome Otshusses, � Eighth Night of Crearion ( 1978), translated from the French 
by A. D. Martin Sperry (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), p. 195. For devotees 
there is more on lacer pages. 
19 This paper has beneAtcd immeasurably from comments made on earli.er versions at 
different dmes by Max Blade, Paul Ziff, and Fred Dretske. In different form it 
was presented a few years ago at a colloquium at the Universiry of Warwick, where 
the lively discussion was most enlightening. I remember particularly the contribu# 
dons made to the discussion and to my enlightenment, by Phillips Griffiths, Don 
Locke, Cyril Barrett, Martin Warner, Roger Sprigge, and C. Battershee, as well as 
some others whose names I neglected to mark down. lf this paper's defects still out­
weigh its merits, aU of them arc obviously co blame, for they did not kill it ouoight. 
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...: It b co t'C undt<rsto .. 'IJ dm."IUl!h1. ut lhat � hc:n t\\ l' lor ffillf"d con cpls. A a°'i B • • m.' 
.. �lkcn ' r � �}lar. ;\ and B al"(" J1,nnn .mJ n�nher �1l"mm<'U!' n"r �u1v:ilcm 
(flu.<- a.:idmon \  � 'U��ceJ t('I me �' m' ()llca!?Ue lAln Ha�nun. anJ he.· ma' � 
nght in thmkm� u m.•t.-d1...J ll'l � made exph n.l 
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